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Confronting the Robinson Crusoe paradigm with household-size 
heterogeneity 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Modern macroeconomics empirically addresses economy-wide incentives behind 
economic actions by using insights from the way a single representative household would 
behave. This analytical approach requires that incentives of the poor and the rich are 
strictly aligned. In empirical analysis, a challenging complication is that consumer and 
income data are typically available at the household level, and individuals living in multi-
member households have the potential to share goods within the household. The 
analytical approach of modern macroeconomics would require that intra-household 
sharing is also strictly aligned across the rich and the poor. Here we have designed a 
survey method that allows the testing of this stringent property of intra-household sharing 
and find that it holds: once expenditures for basic needs are subtracted from disposable 
household income, household-size economies implied by the remainder household 
incomes are the same for the rich and the poor. 
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Governments, corporations, and the public are eager to know about the performance 
prospects of a national or regional economy as a whole, in order to evaluate and develop 
economic policies and business strategies. Macroeconomic analysis seeks to understand 
the incentives behind aggregated economic choices in the overall economy. The 
mainstream macroeconomic paradigm (1) relies upon an artificial construct, the 
“representative consumer” (2-5), whose choices always coincide with actual aggregated 
choices under any commodity prices. This idea links the behavior of the “small” (the 
household as a microeconomic unit) with the “large” (aggregated choices of households), 
motivating that the study of aggregate demanded quantities of a consumer basket reveals 
an accurate summary of incentives behind economic actions in the overall economy. The 
necessary and sufficient conditions underlying the existence of a representative consumer 
are extremely stringent, requiring that incentives driven by needs and wants of the rich 
and the poor are strictly aligned (6).  
 
In empirical analysis of macroeconomic models a difficulty is that consumer and income 
data are typically available at the household level, and individuals in multi-member 
households have the potential to share goods within the household (housing, home 
appliances, transportation, etc.). Whenever intra-household sharing takes place, larger 
households need lower per-capita income in order to attain a certain level of material 
comfort (7), i.e., household-size economies are achieved. For maintaining the cornerstone 
assumption of modern macroeconomic theory, an extremely stringent condition is 
necessary to hold: once expenditures for basic needs of larger or smaller household types 
are subtracted from disposable household income, household-size economies implied by   4
the remainder household incomes should be the same for the rich and the poor (6). Here 
we have designed a survey method that allows the testing of this stringent property of 
intra-household sharing. The method is equipped with a tool to test whether respondents 
understand the survey’s questions and communicate credible information.  
 
Alignment of incentives and choices  
In classical economics, incentives behind consumer choices of households are captured 
by utility functions: functions that relate the consumed quantities of goods with ordinal 
evaluations of material comfort. These functions possess structure that leads to a unique 
best choice for households that are price-takers. Mainstream macroeconomics focuses on 
the utility that an infinitely-lived dynasty (seen as a household) obtains by the 
consumption flow of a composite commodity basket throughout an infinite horizon. 
 
Using the neoclassical paradigm for household behavior that can be incorporated into 
macroeconomic environments with production, first, we fully characterize the class of 
utility functions of heterogeneous households that leads to the existence of a 
representative consumer: a fictitious consumer whose preferences represent an entire 
community-preference profile (the set of utility functions of all household types), and 
whose choices always coincide with actual aggregated choices under any price regime. 
These preferences are the same as the “Gorman preferences” indicated as sufficient for 
the existence of a representative consumer in other studies (3-5). We show (6) that the 
requirement that a representative consumer exists in the presence of household-size 
heterogeneity implies a linear relationship necessarily links all equivalent incomes (EIs)   5
in an economy: household incomes that equalize the level of material comfort of persons 
living in different household types. 
 
Approach for estimating economies of household size 
To quantify household-size economies is to estimate EIs. Economies of household size 
take place if the additional expenditure needed by a household with an additional member 
to keep its level of material comfort at the same level as before is less than 100% of the 
EI of a one-member household. For this reason, from a set of EIs of different household 
types, it is plausible to view the EI of a one-member household as a benchmark and call it 
reference income (RI). Based on household-level income data, the one-member-
household EI can be assigned to each household member and all individuals of an 
economy can be viewed as living in separate one-member households.  
 
There is no general agreement on a method to determine which EIs should be used in 
official statistics. Econometricians use consumer expenditure data of different household 
types and make assumptions in order to build demand systems that identify when two 
households with different demographic composition have the same level of material 
comfort. Results are sensitive to these assumptions (10-11). Thus, the OECD and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) use an expert who assigns EIs to different household 
types relying on her/his intuition, insights, and familiarity with descriptive statistics from 
household data (12). Still, experts disagree (13). For these reasons we have designed a 
survey method where we ask respondents to provide us with their own assessments of EIs 
for a set of household types.    6
 
The motivation of our survey relies on the idea that respondents are experienced at 
recognizing the connection between a household’s demographic composition and the 
level of material comfort that income can buy for its members. In this sense, respondents 
are ‘real-life experts’ in assessing EIs. Pooling diverse insights of a large number of 
respondents may correct potential biases of a single expert. Our method is equipped with 
a tool that tests whether people ‘mean what they say’ (14). 
 
It is an open question as to whether people are ‘expert enough’ to answer the following 
type of question: “What is the net monthly household income that can make a household 
with two adults and a child attain the same level of material comfort as that of a one-
member household with a net monthly income of $2,000?” Respondents must have 
sufficient information to assess EIs for households with a demographic composition and a 
level of material comfort that differ from their own actual experiences. Otherwise, 
estimates of EI may suffer from limited information bias (LIB). Moreover, respondents 
should demonstrate sufficient understanding in answering the question about assessing 
EIs. To test for this crucial aspect of survey effectiveness, we also pose an equivalent 
assessment problem using different means of representation, and then cross-check for 
consistency. 
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Survey design 
Our questionnaire consists of two main parts (6). In Part A, we pre-assign a net monthly 
income for a one-member household, a reference income (RI), and ask respondents to 
state EIs for seven other household types. Each respondent is randomly assigned one of 
several RIs. The question asked is of the following type: “What is the net monthly 
household income that can make a household with two adults and a child attain the same 
level of material comfort as that of a one-member household with a net monthly income 
of $2,000? What income would one need if, instead, there were two children in the 
household?” 
 
In Part B we pose an equivalent assessment problem to this of Part A, using different 
means of representation to cross-check for consistency: Likert-scale evaluations (15) of 
material comfort. The question we ask is: “Consider that the net monthly household 
income of a household with two adults and one child is $5,500. State a number from 1 to 
100 that best characterizes the level of material comfort of this household, given that ‘10’ 
is ‘very bad,’ ‘50’ is ‘sufficient,’ and ‘90’ is ‘very good.’” Respondents receive such a 
question for the one-member household and the seven household types of Part A. 
Household incomes evaluated in Part B were obtained through a previous pilot study in 
Germany using the same RIs as in Part A (16). If a respondent states a Likert-scale value 
for a household type with pre-assigned income Y that is higher than what she/he stated 
for the one-member household with the RI in Part B, then, in Part A, this respondent 
should have stated an EI for that household type that is lower than Y. 
   8
 
Testing whether “people mean what they say” 
The existence of a common, “cardinal” perception of verbal characterizations such as 
“good” or “bad” is not guaranteed (9). This problem can make stated Likert-scale values 
in Part B noisy across individuals. To suppress such inter-respondent noise we construct 
the variable “normalized Likert-scale evaluation” (NLSE). The NLSE uses the stated 
Likert-scale value concerning the one-member household as a benchmark, and measures 
the deviation of each other Likert-scale value stated by the same respondent from this 
benchmark. If people “mean what they say,” the NLSE should be negatively correlated 
with deviations of the stated EIs from the RIs provided in Part A (17).   
 
Consistency between responses in Parts A and B of the survey is tested through the 
inclusion of NLSE in regression analysis. In our sample, NLSE exhibits low variation 
across respondents, and a large fraction of respondents have NLSE values equal to or 
near zero (6). All coefficients of NLSE are negative (see Table 1) and exclusion tests are 
always rejected (P<0.001), supporting the premise that the survey elicits credible 
information (6). The reason why NLSE should be included as a conditioning variable in 
the regression is that it can control for deviant opinions by some respondents about 
household-size economies, e.g., about the costs of children (18). Nevertheless, the 
estimated NLSE coefficients indicate that such effects are small. 
   9
Testing for LIB 
To test for LIB, we distinguish answers from respondents who state an EI for the 
household type and/or living standard that is the same as their own, from answers given 
about the same household type and/or living standard by respondents whose 
characteristics are different. The presence of LIB is tested in regression analysis through 
a test of exclusion of dummy variables that identify this relationship between 
respondents’ personal characteristics and the features of households that respondents 
evaluate. Generally, LIB does not exist, or it is small when present: only in 2 tests out of 
21 cases LIB dummy coefficients are significant (P<0.05), and only in one case the 
exclusion test is rejected (P<0.01) (6). Still, in these two cases the impact of LIB on EI 
estimates is small. LIB tests show that respondents exhibit a sufficient ability to evaluate 
hypothetical households with characteristics different from their own. The NLSE tests in 
conjunction with these LIB tests show that the agreement concerning EI assessments 
among the groups of respondents distinguished by the LIB dummy variables is not due to 
common misunderstanding. 
 
In regression analysis we use a large set of other personal characteristics of the 
respondents as conditioning variables. Education plays a small role, with the more 
educated respondents stating higher EIs, but only for household types with children. 
Probably, more educated parents pursue higher education for their children. Respondents 
who live in the former East Germany stated moderately higher EI values in all cases (19). 
No other personal characteristics appear robust (6).  
   10
 
Patterns of Household-Size Economies 
The scatter plots of responses in Part A of the survey appear in Figure 1. They suggest 
that the relationship between EI and RI is linear: for all seven household types, a sixth-
degree polynomial least-squares curve is hardly distinguishable from a linear fit (for the 
fourth RI (EUR 2,750) only, the polynomial fit indicates a slight deviation downwards).  
 
F tests of the linear specification in regression analysis indicate that the linear 
specification is never rejected at P<0.01: test statistics vary within the moderate values 
from 2.36 to 3.60, and the coefficients of RI dummy variables are small. All straight lines 
appearing in Figure 1 have a positive intercept (P<0.001), indicating the presence of fixed 
costs in consumption (e.g., minimum housing rents, basic nutrition, heating, etc.). Fixed 
costs in consumption are a plausible explanation about why household-size economies 
are smaller when the RI is low (20). When income is low, household members are forced 
to spend higher shares of income on vital needs, such as food and clothing, minimum 
housing space, expenditures with, plausibly, low sharing potential.  
 
This linear relationship among EIs is also present in all pilot studies we have previously 
run in six countries, appearing in Figures 2 and 3. Figures 2 and 3 present the scatter plots 
for purchasing-power-parity (PPP) adjusted Euros for Germany in year 2006. A sixth-
degree polynomial fit is visually close to a line, and the linear specification test passes 
(P<0.001) in all 42 cases examined (6). What distinguishes these pilot studies from the   11
present survey is that smaller samples have been used and each respondent stated EIs for 
all RIs.  
 
Conclusions 
A challenge with estimating household-size economies is that the extent to which people 
share goods within a household is a ‘black box,’ difficult to observe or measure directly. 
Our survey instrument in its pilot form, where the same respondent is called to evaluate 
five different RIs, revealed a robust linear pattern between EIs and RIs (see Figures 2 and 
3). This regularity is astonishing, but it could be that respondents approximate the 
connection between RI and EI using a linear rule of thumb, and that the average of such 
linear mappings is still linear. Yet, when each of five independent groups of respondents 
evaluate a different RI, finding the linear pattern between RI and EI again supports the 
premise that such a simple pattern pervades economic incentives and decisions. This 
interpretation of the finding is validated by the fact that respondents must think of what 
decisions members of hypothetical households make before stating their EI assessments. 
 
The surprising simple relationship among EIs lends support to the stringent assumption 
made by macroeconomists, that the rich and the poor have the same orientation in their 
incentives and actions, responding similarly to, say, oil-price changes: so, whole 
aggregate demands in markets may behave as if driven by a single representative 
individual. Yet, having EIs linearly related is only a reconfirmation of a necessary 
condition that should hold if the Robinson Crusoe paradigm is true, not a solid proof of 
the paradigm itself. So, further study and more stringent tests of the paradigm are needed.   12
Most importantly, why this surprisingly simple pattern is present begs for an answer, 
which might come from evolutionary theory, sociological theory of social norms, or from 
evolutionary biology examining the natural tendency of humans to imitate/cooperate. 
 
Not least, quantifying household-size economies is of separate value on its own: it is 
potentially useful to epidemiological studies assessing how social inequalities and 
stressors affect health outcomes in a society (21); to studies examining the connection 
between child poverty and child outcomes (22); to the development of sociological and 
ethnological theories of the structure of the family and cultural transmission (23-24); to 
economic explanations of fertility trends (25); to the design of welfare systems for 
children and single parents (26-27). In particular, for the formulation of applied models 
that address policy issues related to marriage decisions (28), fertility (29), and labor 
participation decisions (30), accurate estimates of household-size economies are an 
essential prerequisite and ‘goodness-of-fit’ criterion. Our study has suggested and tested a 
reliable instrument to estimate household-size economies. 
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Forschungsgemeinschaft, contract No. Schm1396/1-1. Table 1. Summary of ordinary least squares regressions. Endogenous variable: ratio of equivalent 
income stated by respondents divided by reference income. Number of observations: 2,042; p-values 
of F-tests in brackets. 
*** p<0.001, 
** p<0.01,  
* p<0.05. 
 
 Household  type 
  1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Constant 
  1.06
*** 
1.12
***  1.20
***  1.42
***  1.44
***  1.53
***  1.61
*** 
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
 
269.74
***  498.34
***  728.85
***  329.38
***  592.99
***  839.25
***  1,079.86
*** 
Dummy 
reference income 
equals 1,250 Euros 
0.00
  -0.00
  -0.02
  0.03
  0.00
  -0.02
  -0.04
 
Dummy  
reference income 
equals 2,000 Euros 
0.02
*  0.02
  0.02
  0.00
  -0.00
  -0.00
  -0.02
 
Dummy  
reference income 
equals 2,750 Euros 
-0.02
*  -0.04
**  -0.07
**  -0.05
*  -0.08
**  -0.11
***  -0.13
*** 
Normalized Likert-
scale evaluation  -0.04
***
 -0.07
***
 -0.10
***
 -0.05
***
 -0.07
***
 -0.09
***
 -0.13
***
 
Same family type 
of respondent  0.04 -0.01 -0.14
*
  0.02 0.02 0.01  0.01 
Same living 
standard of 
respondent 
-0.01  -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00 -0.03  -0.05 
Same family type 
and living standard 
of respondent 
-0.06 0.13  -0.03 0.05 -0.16
*
  -0.02 -0.04 
Adjusted R
2  0.46  0.53 0.54 0.30 0.46 0.52  0.54 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference-income 
dummy variables 
2.36 
[0.07] 
3.07
* 
[0.03] 
3.29
* 
[0.02] 
3.60
*
 
[0.01] 
3.37
*
 
[0.02] 
3.45
*
 
[0.02] 
3.51
* 
[0.01] 
 
 
 Figure 1.   Scatter plots of stated EIs in  
Part A of the survey for each RI and  
each family type.   
         6
th degree polynomial fit. 
         linear regression. 
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